Posted by Jeffrey Thayne
Although agency and indeterminism are often equated in popular rhetoric, the two philosophical concepts are very different things. Indeterminism, as Williams defines it, is the philosophy that events have no antecedents, or in other words, that they are inherently arbitrary or random. Random choices are no more meaningful, however, than inevitable choices; therefore, in order to preserve meaning and purpose, we have to preserve some kind of relevant connection between an agentic act and its antecedents. Although this rules out indeterminism (as defined here), we have yet to discuss the kind of meaningful connection the won’t make actions inevitable (or determined, in the traditional sense of the word).
Richard Williams explains what he calls a minimalist definition of determinism, which is a kind of determinism that preserves actions from both inevitability on one hand and arbitrariness on the other:
I believe it is simply this—that there is meaning, order, and continuity in the world owing to the fact that all events (and acts) have meaningful antecedents—antecedents without which the events would either not occur, or would not be what they are. What is at issue in an adequate conceptual understanding of agency, then, is not whether all events have such antecedents, but to understand the nature of the relationship between particular events and antecedents.1
In other words, a believer in mechanical determinism would say that an event or human action had a cause, which inevitably resulted in the event or action. A believer in agency (or what Williams calls minimal determinism) would say that an event or human action had an antecedent, which was connected to the event or action in a meaningful or relevant way. Williams then gives a metaphor or example of the kind of relevant antecedent he is speaking of:
We can find an example of such links in the strong relation that exists between a plot of a novel and any number of subplots. Without the plot, certainly any subplot would not be at all, or at least, would not be what it is. However, there is never just one subplot that can possibly arise from any particular plot. Once a subplot arises, it can be rewritten, abandoned, or woven back into the plot at any number of points in the plot. This example conforms to the requirements of [minimal] determinism, yet it preserves possibility and the agency of the author.1
While the example is far from perfect, it opens the possibility that acts and events may have strong and relevant connections to their antecedents, but in a way that does not make the act or event inevitable. These connections are relevant and meaningful, such as those in narrative, but not mechanistic or causal in a scientific sense. While some may use the term indeterminism to describe any philosophy which claims that events are not inevitable, Williams prefers to call this form of connection minimal determinism, and defines indeterminism as the philosophy that events have no antecedents, but are merely random or arbitrary.
DeterminismIndeterminism
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Events and actions are inevitable. The preceding conditions are causesthat determine the outcome.Events and actions are not inevitable. The preceding conditions are relevant antecedentsthat give meaning and purpose to the outcome.Events and actions are not inevitable. They are unrelated to any preceding condition, and they are thus random and arbitrary. | Williams’s labels | Necessary determinism | Minimal determinism |
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I like this because it helps us avoid the problem I discussed in my previous post: the conflation of agency and chance. It also allows us to account for human behavior, but in a different way than a materialist might. Rather than account for human behavior in mechanical terms, we could account for it in narrative terms (or other non-mechanical terms). This possibility is precluded in many libertarian accounts of free-will, for agentic action in a libertarian point of view is non-explainable (at least, how I have often interpreted it).
The main point is, if we want to believe in agency, we should focus our conversation away from the “causes” of human behavior and instead focus on “making sense” of human behavior. We can still “account for” human behavior, just not in necessary and causal terms.
Notes
1. Richard Williams, “The Freedom and Determinism of Agency” (Brigham Young University).
It’s been awhile since I’ve visited. How’s everything going? You know the drill:
I don’t think that very many people will disagree that the “plot” of a movie puts the subplot in context, or that the fact that other, relevant things have happened in the past adds additional meaning or purpose to a present action, but that comes a long way from explaining why an event happened (note that I do not say “cause” because your philosophy obviously does not hinge upon determining a cause).
Your (and Williams’) definition of the “antecedent” is far closer to the grammatical definition than the standard use of the word, which mainly refers to something that occurs before something else (“One that precedes another” by one dictionary).
The grammatical term has it thusly: “The word, phrase, or clause that determines what a pronoun refers to. . .”
If we apply this to events (“The [event or action] that determines what a [present action] refers to”), and we confine our definition of “present action” for the moment to “a human action” then we might drum up some thesis statement like this:
“People do the particular things that they do because other things have happened which give their current choices meaning.” This certainly seems to approximate our perspective toward our own choices (i.e. I take stock of my situation and act accordingly), but will hardly satisfy the demands of real determinists.
Incorporating some form of “minimal determinism” into the equation probably won’t do much to satisfy them either, any more than gung-ho seven-day Creationists would be assuaged by some kind of “minimal Evolution.” I still don’t understand how a philosophy as absolute and unyielding as determinism can be accepted partially, even when replacing the word “cause” with the word “antecedent” (which by its definition really just admits that one of the events precedes the other chronologically).
Clumpy: I still don’t understand how a philosophy as absolute and unyielding as determinism can be accepted partially
I can see what you are getting at. I wish I were a more eloquent writer. Perhaps I should clarify that William’s “minimal determinism” isn’t a “partial determinism” or “a little determinism,” in the sense that we are accepting a little bit of determinism, but just not a whole lot of it, etc. I guess in that sense, the word “minimal” is deceiving. Rather, William’s “minimal determinism” is a full-fledged determinism of a completely and qualitatively different kind. So I see it as not “less of the same,” but rather “something different under a similar name.”
I agree this isn’t going to satisfy determinists, because it doesn’t resolve the problem, but rather invites us to ask different questions. Instead of asking, “What are the mechanical causes of human behavior?” , we should ask, “In what ways can we make sense of these actions? What are the antecedent conditions that gave these actions context and meaning?” The answer to the second question may not sound very scientific, and thus may be very unsatisfactory to scientists who are accustomed to mechanical determinism.
As far as causes go, I should clarify that I don’t see human action as having what we might consider traditionally scientific causes. “Cause” can have varying degrees of meaning, and not all of them bad.
Perhaps I ought to write about this sometime, because you have reminded me of a another thought I’ve had for a while: psychologists often treat agency as one of many possible “causes” of an action—they ask, “Was this action caused by biology, environmental stimuli, or agency?” The problem with this is that it puts agency in an awkward position… if the scientist can identify biological or environmental causes, then agency wasn’t a cause. Or, if agency is a cause, then it cannot be connected to environmental or biological antecedents. I don’t like that implication. This is another reason why I appreciate Williams’ perspective, because it avoids this problematic rhetoric of treating agency as one “cause” among many.
Jeff: Instead of asking, “What are the mechanical causes of human behavior?†, we should ask, “In what ways can we make sense of these actions? What are the antecedent conditions that gave these actions context and meaning?†The answer to the second question may not sound very scientific, and thus may be very unsatisfactory to scientists who are accustomed to mechanical determinism.
Maybe you could help me translate this into an everyday occurence?
For example, let’s say I’m hungry and sick of eating vegetables so I ordered a bacon pizza from Little Ceasar’s (holy heck, those things are good). A determinist might say that I was hungry, and, having enjoyed that particular food item in the past and in similar situations (empty stomach, subconsciously craving meat and protein because I’d been eating vegetables all day, etc.) I went for the bacon pizza.
The question of whether I went for a bacon pizza specifically might be explained by the fact that I noticed an orange and black school bus walking home from school and immediately thought of Little Ceasar’s color scheme, but only at a subconscious level where I didn’t notice it. Perhaps Bulgarian food would have hit the spot better, but the deterministic events of my life hadn’t yet allowed me to taste it so my body and brain didn’t even have that option available for their “decision”. Still deterministic. So I thought I was acting agentically with my pizza but it was really a result of determinist, mechanical factors.
Obviously that’s counter-intuitive and probably wrong. It’s just a little too confidently-stated and concerns such a fundamental element of the universe that it’s more a symptom of the scientist’s desire to get the world to make sense than anything.
But how would your philosophy put the pizza situation? Here’s the best that I can come up with:
“My hunger, as well as my previous enjoyment of pizza and need for certain nutrients at the time of dinner were merely meaningful antecedents which provided context for my agentic decision to get pizza.”
This also sounds strange and “incomplete” to me. If you were to say that this “antecedent” philosophy is a sort of framework philosophy designed to keep us from going overboard and discounting human agency without proof, this would satisfy me. We’re pretty much discussing the deepest, darkest secret of the universe here so a little ambiguity is appropriate and refreshing. This “antecedent” philosophy is less concretely-stated so it cannot be shot down, making it a perfect placeholder to keep us from doing damage to ourselves. It’s certainly no worse than determinism, which I feel actually has negative effects if widely believed (especially since the layman would take it as endorsement of hedonistic (and especially nihilistic) behavior).
I agree with you that agency cannot be just another factor in decisions. People that really try to have it both ways are deluding themselves.
QED, you should really try the bacon pizza. It’s really good.
Jeff: William’s minimal determinism is a full-fledged determinism of a completely and qualitatively different kind. So I see it as not less of the same, but rather “something different under a similar name.â€
I predict that ‘minimal determinism’ will receive a cool reception from behavioral scientists until this concept is clearly delineated. Someone is going to have to pull it out of the clouds and package it as an empirical concept, a concept that can be measured like biological and environmental events. This may explain why agency has not received more attention from behavioral scientists; it can’t be operationalized very well.
IMO, science’s dogmatic adherence to a material ontology is limiting our understanding of what is real, in a general sense. I suspect that getting science to respect minimal determinism will be a bit like getting science to respect string theory—the logic is there, but the empirical evidence is not.
I agree that behavioral scientists will ask for empirical evidence; I’m not sure how to give it to them, though, since this is a way of interpreting empirical evidence, proposed as an alternative to the traditional way of interpreting the evidence. There is no empirical evidence of mechanistic determinism, because it is merely a way of interpreting our sensory experience, not an experience in and of itself.
Clumpy: We’re pretty much discussing the deepest, darkest secret of the universe here so a little ambiguity is appropriate and refreshing.
I agree. I expect to gain further insight into fundamental realities like agency by talking about them. But I don’t expect them to ever achieve the 100% articulability philosophy aims for, much less the 100% measurability, quantifiability, and testability that science aims for. There’s no harm in attempting periodically to articulate or quantify them if it piques discussion . . . unless we fool ourselves into thinking we’ve actually achieved that aim.
Dave: IMO, science’s dogmatic adherence to a material ontology is limiting our understanding of what is real, in a general sense.
Only if the scientist ignores the premises of science. John Pratt, an astronomer (whose articles I love to read) makes an important point:
It seems to me that even a materialist, if he were a true scientist, would have to acknowledge that there may be unobservable factors in his material formula. And the scientific answer to unobservable phenomena is not “Isn’t real”; it’s “No comment.”
Nathan,
I will say that materialists tend not just to limit reality to what is observable (as you argue, not true science), but also to impose a particular, mechanistic interpretation onto what they do observe. This, I would argue, is limiting our understanding of what is real, as Dave said.
Hey Jeff,
Great, thought provoking article. I also liked that Clumpy tied it back to real life contexts. From experience (not abstract logic) it does seem that human action (or reaction) is not inevitably agentic nor inevitably determined, but that these two possibilities somehow coexist or interact. It seems that many of the philosophical problems only result from trying to universalize each possibility. So I agree with you Jeff, although I’m also not sure I like the term “minimal determinism.”
I think James Allen talked about agency and determinism both operating at the same time. He liked to think of thought as being a potentially agentic cause and behavior and circumstances as being effects determined by thought (final causal or teleological determinism). So once the thought was fully formed, the outcome of the thought was fully determined. The thinker, as well as perhaps others around her or him would be buffeted by the behavioral and circumstantial consequences of the thought as though they had no choice in the matter.
Allen did, however, seem to acknowledge that not all thoughts are conscious (reminiscent of the final causal determinism of the psychoanalytic school). An external or internal influence may thus provoke a subconscious thought, as Clumpy proposed, which results in a behavior that seems determined by the original influence (since, Skinner-like, we are unaware of the interceding thought).
So here is where determinism may operate even upon our thoughts, that is, insofar as we are unaware of our thoughts. Education then, or enlightenment (or “insight” as even deterministic psychologists sometimes call it), should increase our awareness of the influences upon our thoughts and subsequent behaviors, thus increasing our agency. For Freud, this insight would take years of psychoanalysis if it ever came, thus placing us at the mercy of the therapist and entrenching us deeper in determinism. For Allen, insight could come quickly with simple introspection, meditation, prayer and/or education.
As Allen suggested, when we intervene at the level of thought, everything changes. In full awareness of my thoughts, when I see that orange and black school bus I will think “that reminds me of Little Caesar’s Pizza.” I will then be in a position to decide whether or not a school bus is sufficient reason to opt for bacon pizza over a new experience with Bulgarian food.
However, awareness only helps if there is an actual possibility of doing otherwise. If there were no Bulgarian food (or other possibilities), even awareness might not help me avoid the heart stopping bacon pizza. But in real life there are always other possibilities, and so the only thing standing between determinism and agency is knowledge of those possibilities (and/or belief in them). We act (vs react) to the extent that we know or believe that we CAN act. Thus William James’ statement that he would choose to believe in agency–because the implications were much more meaningful than those of determinism–is much deeper and more powerful than it may appear on the surface. In the moment of choosing to believe in agency, agency is born in actuality. Knowledge is indeed power.
This possibility that awareness begets agency in an otherwise deterministic world seems consistent with scripture:
And now, my sons, I speak unto you these things for your profit and learning; for there is a God, and he hath created all things, both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them are, both things to act and things to be acted upon. And to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man…it must needs be that there was an opposition; even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life; the one being sweet and the other bitter. Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other (2 Nephi 2:14-16).
So in order for choice–or agentic action rather then simply deterministic reaction–to occur there has to be both an alternative possibility and the awareness that the possibility exists (or “enticement” regarding both possibilities).
Jung joins with Lehi in emphasizing the necessity of opposites. For Jung the alternative possibility did not necessarily have to be an actual thing, but a possibility formed simultaneously in our minds in response to an original possibility. That is, in the moment that we are presented with the possibility of life we perceive the possibility of death. We perceive light only in contrast with darkness. We cannot comprehend what light IS without simultaneously comprehending what light is NOT. In the moment we comprehend the “tree of life,” then, the “tree of knowledge” is “born” since we now know something about the possibility of death. We now know something about both good and evil. This could also be said in the reverse: in the moment we comprehend or “partake of” the tree of knowledge we comprehend both life and death. Interesting that the tree of knowledge is not of good OR evil, but of good AND evil. Knowledge in this sense equates to an awareness of choice, and the possibility of choice begets knowledge.
Limited knowledge or awareness, then, begets both life and death. When we are not fully aware of the influences, and intervening thoughts, sometimes we take the pizza over the salad, sometimes the reverse. This places us in a fearful situation where we seem surrounded by waves, wind, and death. There seems to be no constancy and we feel buffeted and tossed. We try one thing and we feel pain. We try another thing and we feel pleasure. In another context we try the first and feel pleasure, whereas the second brings pain. We are unsure of where to turn because we lack knowledge of where safety can be obtained. There are too many variables, too many contexts. We begin to feel that the only thing constant is change.
Through all the waves and winds and darkness we see one constant Light. The offer of life amid death. Faith is acceptance of a Savior’s offer of life even with the knowledge that death is a distinct possibility. We all stand in the boat. Between us and LIFE, the waves of “not life” or “death” are raging. The choice to step out of the boat is ours, but only One can bring us across.
I’ve not read the comments yet but here’s a potential problem. Williams seems to talk about antecedants and then indicates that this can account for agency. But I can’t see this because there are non-agent middle grounds between absolute determinism and absolute chance. Consider QM where any event is partially random and partially determined. That is it has antecedants but is also undetermined.
So how, according to Williams, do we distinguish this not-intentional meaningful even from agency? (Or should we?)
There are two ways to take this. The obvious one is the hermeneutical reading. And I’m not discounting that in the least. I just want to point out that in physics we often don’t talk about causes the way you are assuming a “mechanical determinism.” That went out when Newton was overthrown (but is for most scenarios good enough which is why we still use it).
In QM while we don’t normally talk “meanings” we do talk about how context relates to particular events. And, given a context, we can talk about the range of possible events. The selection of one event (often caught up in the notion of the “collapse of the wave function” although I don’t like that terminology) has prior events as antecedants but we can’t talk about a necessary relationship between one and the other.
So I think anyone raising an opposition between physicalism and mental agency on these grounds is doomed to failure given the role this way of thinking already plays in physics.
A few other thoughts.
1. It seems odd to claim science only talks about observables. Most of the interesting claims in science – especially in physics – are about unobservables. We infer truths about unobservables from observables. And if philosophy of science in the 20th century established but one thing it is that all observations are theory laden. So I think you’re attacking a view of science that few have held for over 50 years. (Well actually John Pratt at Meridian was – but I think he gets lots of things demonstrably wrong)
2. All scientists recognize that there may be unobserved (as opposed to intrinisically unobservable) phenomena. This is constantly talked about both in science classes and philosophy of science. Indeed even a brief reading of history shows this in play. (Consider the revolutions at the beginning of the 20th century) It seems odd to say that science doesn’t do this. Consider at a minimum classical mechanics and the three completely different formulations (Newton’s formulations, the Lagrangian formulation and the Hamiltonian formulation) each with different meanings (Forces & causes, minimization of potential energy and then evolution of energy). There is no way to distinguish between them since the mathematics are equivalent. But that doesn’t bother a scientist. They just say some answers are undetermined. And as for future evidence that may overturn current theory that’s always acknolwedged. Fallibilism is an intrinsic part of science.
In reference to Mike’s comments, I wasn’t trying to put “antecedent-ism” into a real-world context, but to point out how incomplete I felt that idea was as well. Nor was I really pushing the deterministic angle, though I believe that the wealth of evidence for some sort of subconscious is pretty unambiguous. I understand Jeff feels differently.
Clark, no proponent of “partial determinism” will admit to their philosophy as a mishmash of deterministic and agentic philosophies. For the record, I feel it’s an attempt to have your cake and eat it too – to write long and hard about a new, above all fresh philosophy that is so poorly-defined that it can only be explained in one way and means precious little.
Clumpy: I believe that the wealth of evidence for some sort of subconscious is pretty unambiguous.
Although this is a very different subject, I’m not sure how anyone can claim this, since the “subconscious” is merely a way of interpreting the evidence. This claim, in my mind, is analogous to someone saying, “The evidence for luck is unambiguous, since I’ve experienced so many things that can only be explained that way.” Well, the evidence doesn’t demonstrate anything—we are just in the business of trying to interpret it.
Clumpy: … A new, above all fresh philosophy that is so poorly-defined that it can only be explained in one way and means precious little.
Well, of all the neighborly ways to help someone refine a nascent idea, that certainly wasn’t one of them. 🙂 Come on, Clumpy, I think you’re better than that!
When talking about the subconscious I’ve discovered one has to ask what people mean by it. (The notion of the subconscious goes way back to Plotinus and reformulated in the modern era by Leibniz – just a note to any readers not familiar)
I take the theory of the subconscious to merely be the idea that descriptions we use to apply to mental states we’re aware of consciously also can apply to processes we’re not aware of. It gets tricky since many see the mental as reducible to the physical and so they argue the subconscious as mental descriptions as disposable.
To me the whole issue is really about what kinds of descriptions are allowable. But I recognize not everyone frames the debate that way.
“Although this is a very different subject, I’m not sure how anyone can claim this, since the “subconscious†is merely a way of interpreting the evidence.”
Perhaps anatomists understand the “subconscious” in a technical way that can’t be fully verified, but the evidence (even personal evidence) for a layer of human thought beyond that level at the surface that is immediately noticable is pretty much incontrovertible.
You can even apply it beyond instinct (though things like breathing semiautomatically, blinking in response to peripheral movement or automatically throwing your arms in front of you when you fall certainly apply). I think of the subconscious as something like a hard drive and my immediate thought process as something like RAM. Naturally I can only concentrate on a few things at once, but I have a wealth of experiences and emotions that I can recall with the right stimuli. It’s a safety valve the brain gives us which keeps us from having to confront the entirety of everything we’ve ever experienced at all times.
As a consequence, some of our actions seem involuntary until we think about it later. Call it the passions of the body if you’d like – things we can and need to overcome to get some sort of inner peace. But I’m getting sidetracked.
@Nathan:
“Well, of all the neighborly ways to help someone refine a nascent idea, that certainly wasn’t one of them. 🙂 Come on, Clumpy, I think you’re better than that!”
Hey – I didn’t exactly make it a personal attack or go for harshness out of spite. My earlier statements were misinterpreted as milquetoast “supportive comments” so I cut the ambiguity and went for the jugular. Grrr. “Nascent ideas” have a way of becoming entrenched philosophies if you don’t get started right away. And I’m not sure how I’m supposed to “refine” an idea whose central premise I disagree with.
As I’ve said above, at best I find a sort of spiritual resonance with the idea of incorporating a healthy respect for ambiguity into our reasoning processes, but this philosophy itself is more a step sideways than a real progression: the strength of ambiguity can’t quite make up for the fact that firmly adhering to a whispy philosophy is a contradiction in terms. It’s no better or worse than determinism in and of itself, but as a competitive philosophy it’s outmatched because it doesn’t try to answer the same questions.
When replacing a philosophy that purports to explain “why things happen” (a lofty goal if ever there was one), substituting a philosophy that merely explains that some things “give context” or “meaning” to other things is like explaining to early man that the human race came into being so that we could be happy. Yes, it’s probably true, but it answers a different question. Square pegs are well and good, of course, but they won’t fit in round holes however we force them. Argue that the quest to validate determinism is futile, and I’ll sympathize and probably even agree with you, but this replacement philosophy isn’t.
Clumpy,
While I appreciate what you are saying, I must reply that this is in no way an attempt to introduce ambiguity into our reasoning. It is an attempt to preserve meaning when accounting for the world, because, quite frankly, meaning is lost when you account for the world in a purely mechanistic way. In my mind, a philosophy that preserves meaning is a step forward from a philosophy that does not.
I believe you have misinterpreted the intent and message of the post. The message of the post is not that “We can’t or shouldn’t explain the world”; only that “We can’t explain the world in terms of mechanical or necessary deterministic causes and still preserve meaning and agency.”
If by meaning we mean how things “are” for me then it just isn’t obvious to me that deterministic causes don’t allow it. I can at least understand the arguments for free will being incompatible. The argument for meaningfulness being incompatible would be much more difficult.
Clark,
By meaning, I do not mean how things “are.” At least, I’m not even sure what you mean by that.
By meaning, I mean a world that has a moral framework, where events can matter to us in more than a hedonistic way. If agency does not exist, then neither does meaning, and we are left with a bleak nihilism. That is, a billiard ball doesn’t care if another billiard ball hits it. Also, we don’t put rocks in jail for falling on people. The necessarily determined events don’t have any meaning in that they aren’t good or bad, they just “happened.” There is no good, bad, better, or any sense of evaluative meaning because things just happen in a deterministic framework, and they happen inevitably.
So by meaning you mean moral meaning. So really you are talking about whether “right and wrong” can have sense in a mechanistic universe.
Yep. Sorry if I didn’t make that clear.
In that sense, would you agree that a strictly mechanistic universe leads to the death of moral meaning?
Clark, I’m happy to hear you say this … but psychologists didn’t get the memo.
Psychologists still rely on Percy Bridgman’s operationism that never really caught on in physics and that was debunked by virtually every major philosopher of science over 50 years ago. For this reason, the observable nature of psychology does not adequately understand that all observations are theory laden. Psychology is still in the dark ages here, and shows no intention to move forward.
Yeah, well, you know not everyone even thinks psychology is a science… (grin)
Jeff, no I’m afraid I couldn’t agree with that. While I think causal determinism is false I think Fischer and company do a good job arguing that moral responsibility doesn’t require robust alternatives. I recognize not everyone agrees. But the Frankfurt examples (if we’re going to appeal to intuitions) are pretty compelling.
Clark,
Unfortunately, Frankfurt’s counterexamples are entirely unpersuasive to me; also, I’m not sure they even apply in a mechanistic universe. But I suppose we’ll just have to disagree on this one.
I’m not really surprised, of course. Have you read Fischer’s book?
I haven’t. I am familiar with Frankfurt’s examples, though.
I think the way Fischer uses them relative to responsibility is quite interesting. It’s more subtle than normal uses.