Posted by Jeffrey Thayne
Physicists have noticed that things accelerate at a particular rate when falling towards the earth. After extensive observation, they discovered that the acceleration of falling objects could be generalized and approximated by this particular mathematical equation: 
M represents the mass of the earth, G is a constant value, and R is the distance of the falling object from the earth’s center of mass. This equation describes the rate things generally fall towards the earth. There are no recent observations of things falling differently than as described or predicted by this equation. This equation has often been referred to as the law of gravity. The word gravity comes from the word gravitas, which refers to weight.
Now that We Have a Label …
We have observed a phenomenon: things fall. We give this phenomenon a name: gravity. We describe the phenomenon in great detail: the above equation describes the rate at which things generally fall. As laymen, however, we then do something strange (I don’t think experienced physicists make this mistake); we believe that we have explained the phenomenon: “The law of gravity makes things fall.”
Nobody knows why things fall. Seriously … not a soul on this earth has published a satisfactory explanation for this everyday occurrence. Physicists certainly have fine-tuned ways to predict the rate and trajectory of falling things, but they have never been able to explain the phenomenon.
We are in the habit of imbuing our descriptive labels of our experience with some sort of causal power to make things do stuff. We talk as though gravity (the name we give to falling things) causes things to fall. We speak as if Newton’s equation (a detailed description of the rate things typically fall) causes things to fall at a particular rate. The equation makes it happen, we believe. Mathematics rules the day. (It is interesting that this references the ancient Pythagorean philosophy that the fundamental constituents of the universe are mathematical or geometric constructs.)
Fallacies to Beware
This is a perfect example of what is called the nominalistic fallacy: the belief that labeling an event explains the event. We attach a kind of ontological status to our labels. I believe that generalizing our observations, often into mathematical equations, can be very useful to us; it helps us organize our experiences, and it helps us to predict future experiences. We must, however, be careful of reification. To reify means to “make (something abstract) more concrete or real.”1 Whether all of the so-called “laws of physics” are merely reified descriptions of the world, I don’t know. I just know that we ought to be careful imbuing our English language and mathematics with causal powers.
I’m not sure if our so-called “laws of physics” really explain what happens in the world, or if they are really just detailed observations of the world. I’m leaning towards the latter. It seems odd to me to say that mathematical equations govern the world around us. To me they seem a useful way of describing our experience, but in and of themselves they do not serve as an explanation, nor do I believe that they—in and of themselves—exert a causal force on the world around us. I believe this idea has too many questionable implications to be taken seriously.
I understand that there are many subtleties that I have not addressed in this post. The history of science has taken many twists and turns, and the present scientific paradigm has largely rejected this Newtonian worldview that I describe in this post. I find it refreshing that scientists now see many of the Newton’s laws as merely descriptive generalizations that reflect much more complicated and less easily described processes on a subatomic level. While I’m not convinced that the present scientific paradigm is free of serious philosophical problems, I appreciate the healthy scrutiny that the Newtonian paradigm has gone through over the past century. Physicists are generally very self-aware of their philosophy as they theorize, and don’t often commit the nominalistic fallacy (though they may commit others). Generally, it is the laymen who commit this fallacy with the physicist’s terms. I have used gravity as an example here only because it is one that we are all very familiar with.
Psychologists, however, are very adept at the nominalistic fallacy, and the fallacy has become a near-permanent part of the discipline. It’s interesting how often we as psychologists attribute causal powers to linguistic concepts. A short list might include self-esteem, sexual orientation, communication problems, the subconscious, or anti-social behavioral disorder, among many others. In a future post, Nathan will take a look at more examples of the nominalistic fallacy.
Notes:
1. Oxford Pocket Dictionary, “Reify.”
Awesome post. I was not expecting the link to psychology, but this is so true. I have worked as a teacher within the mental health profession for over 11 years, during which time I have known only a small percentage of practitioners who have not been blinded, at the least, and/or horribly misled by the almighty DSM.
Physicists are generally very self-aware of their philosophy as they theorize, and don’t often commit the nominalistic fallacy.
This is why Newton added “Hypotheses non fingo” (“I feign no hypothesis”) to an essay he appended to his second edition of Principia. People were criticizing him for pretending to offer an “explanation” for the law of gravity. “I feign no hypothesis” was his way of saying, “I am just offering a description of the mathematical principles of gravity.”
Dave, that is really interesting. It seems like Newton saw no necessary connection between discovering equations that describe the natural world, and using that as proof that there’s no need for a God to explain it all. I wonder if that’s why he picked the term “law” for his discoveries—because that necessarily implies the presence of a Law-giver.
Dave,
My point exactly. The general gist of my post is that we (as laymen) too often treat “scientific laws” as a sufficient explanation of the world. I am suggesting a change in rhetoric—these laws are descriptions of the world… generalizations of detailed observations; they do not in and of themselves exert a causal force on the world. Or, if they do, that is not something we can observe, only assume.
This shift in rhetoric would also call into question some of the assumptions we have about the world, such as those Nathan talked about in “Self Evident Premises of Science.” (1 and 2)
Pretty sharp writing on this one.
I believe that the best we’ve gotten is to term gravity a “phenomenon” – a regularly-observable occurrence that we can measure but not explain – and let the laymen think that it’s been explained while the scientists just keep on theorizin’. Funny that gravity is pretty much incompatible with subatomic “law”.
And one thing regarding “law”: Outside of particular philosophies that refute the idea of universal rules, I don’t think that one need believe that the use of a word “law” connotes a lawgiver, though the law does have to come from somewhere, if only a set of conditions. (Certainly the word is commonly understood to mean “rule”.)
For example, even from a religious perspective one might believe that the law of conservation applies equally to all matter (and energy by extension) and is “universal” in that sense, an inherent consequence of physicality. As “material universe” is functionally equivalent to “nature”, we coin the term “natural law”.
The arrogance comes from the idea that the search is over once we’ve given it a name, and that we’ve explained the whole universe through our experience in an infinitesimally small portion of it.
I can’t say I know whether natural laws exist. Certainly the idea of some sort of overriding order to the universe comforts me, but it’s a sour comfort for the overriding order to be so cold. Thanks for letting me prattle on :).
Anybody familiar with the “Perfectly Normal Beasts” from The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy? It’s a similar concept.
Actually quite the opposite. He said that because he felt that only God could explain it and that God was very mathematical in his nature. Newton was an alchemist and hermeticist with rather unorthodox religious beliefs he had to keep secret. But God was behind it all for him.
I think we have to distinguish between precinding a deeper phenomena or universal from reifying. Bad reifying is, for example, saying language is an object independent of its use. Good precinding is to note that a common pattern in collisions with an atom entails a deeper structure. The precinding of gravity towards a deeper structure was done first by Einstein who saw it related to the general curvature of space and time. In quantum mechanics it was due to theoretical entities called virtual particles. These were mathematical structures in graphs called Feynman diagrams. (Roughly, if you’re familiar with mechanics, doing a Lagrangian treatment of QM rather than a Hamiltonian treatment and then noting the structures) However physicists are careful not to unnecessarily reify Feynman diagrams which is why the carriers of force are called virtual particles rather than particles.
PS – in case I wasn’t communicating clearly I agree with you about reifying. I just don’t think it’s as common as some think. “Reification” is a common philosophical attack but often involves misreadings of the figures in question. For instance Heidegger gets accused of reifying language. (Richard Rorty makes this charge, for instance). However it’s completely false.
Thanks for the comment! I appreciate what you mean. It may not be as common in physics (gravity was an unfair example), but it is embedded in almost every theory in psychology.
As I said in my post, I think there is a common reification which physicists try to avoid, but we laymen make all the time: we talk as though mathematical abstractions exert a causal force on the world (this is how I usually interpret, “The laws of physics made it happen”). Physicists don’t often make that claim… they just claim to be reporting and generalizing observations.
I think physicists are like that simply because they have to work out all the different mathematical formulations of mechanics. They are quite different and in terms of the ‘face of it’ readings quite in opposition. For instance the Newtonian formulation is in terms of forces and interactions whereas the Hamiltonian is in terms of the evolution of energy. But they are mathematically identical.
Jeff,
Hi. Are you the same person that I worked for at Coldwell Banker in Draper. If so, I never knew you were a philosopher. I am reading information on gravity in order to teach it to my fourth grade students in Virginia. Your assesment of the scientific understanding of gravity is correct. No one really knows what gravity is – gravitrons, strings? The only thing scientists can agree on is the visible effects of gravity. We can observe that one mass has an effect or pull/force on another mass, ie objects to the earth (although I think this can be explained simply by centrifical force – the rotation of the earth at 666,0000 miles per hour), the moons effect on the tides , and the sun’s gravitational effect on holding the solar sytem together. I assume gravity has a field like a magnet, yet it does not behave in the same manner. If the moon can raise the tides, then why wouldn’t it exert an tremendous force on smaller objects like a rocket ship closer to it. If gravity is the attraction of mass to mass, then why wouldn’t a larger mass like the earth have a stronger pull than the moon over its own waters?
Actually gravity does behave like a magnet although there are no negative gravity sinks that we know of. But the math is pretty much the same.
And the moon does exert a tremendous force on smaller objects like a rocket ship. That’s why they fall.
Also the earth does exert a stronger pull than the moon on its waters. That’s why the water only moves a few feet instead of flying miles into the air.
Jacqui,
Unfortunately, I don’t think I’m the same person. Thanks for the comment, though! I wish you luck teaching about gravity. Stop by again!
Oh boy… you guys are smart! This makes me want to go study all day. Great post and discussion.
Without realizing it, I have argued here in favor of a philosophy generally called nominalism, developed by William of Ockham, in contrast with a philosophy often called realism. Ockham argued we live in a world of particulars, and we generalize from these particulars in order to communicate with each other. These generalities, however, are in our minds; they are artifacts of the human language, and have no ontological reality of their own. Realism holds that universals exist, with their own ontological standing, and can be discerned through reasoned observation. In this issue, I suppose I side with Ockham.
Fascinating post. I want to know if I correctly understand nominalistic fallacy: incorrectly using the description of an observation to explain the force behind the observation. Thus incorrectly attributing the description as being the actual power/force causing what is being observed. Am I close?
Also, I’m not sure I understand your last paragraph and how nominalistic fallacy is being used in psychology. Is your post, “I Know That I Am Nothing” an example of this? Or is that a totally different thing?
I look forward to Nathan’s examples in future posts.
Rachel: Incorrectly attributing the description as being the actual power/force causing what is being observed. Am I close?
Yes, that’s an excellent summary.
… How the nominalistic fallacy is being used in psychology. Is your post, “I Know That I Am Nothing†an example of this?
Not exactly. A hypothetical example of the nominalistic fallacy in psychology would be, say, reifying “temper.” I don’t think many people do this, but this is what it would sound like:
A person observes a collection of behaviors (shouting and hitting things). He labels that set of behaviors “temper.” Then when trying to explain the origins of the behaviors, he treats the label as though it were a causative force, a real entity. There are other examples, too, but I hope this one helped.
Rachel,
Good questions! I think we ought to be clear that we are talking about two different things here, even though they are fairly related: reification and the nominalistic fallacy.
Reification is when we treat an abstract idea as though it were a real thing.
Nominalistic fallacy is when we feel as though we’ve explained something by giving it a name.
Each of the examples we talk about here use a little of each. Thus, Nathan’s example reifies temper; it is a word, an abstract idea, and we treat it as though it were a real thing inside of us that can make us do stuff. We also commit the nominalistic fallacy when we attach the label “temper” to someone’s behavior, and then feel as though we’ve explained it. Thus, Nathan’s example is an example of both, and the concepts are closely related.
Hey, thanks! I wasn’t aware of that subtle distinction myself!
Looking back at Rachel’s question, I think I have a much clearer way of explaining the difference between reifying and the nominal fallacy. Reifying is treating an abstract idea as though it were a real thing (hence reify: re- from real and -ify from to make). The nominal fallacy is when you reify a label. It’s one type of reifying. There are other ways to reify besides committing the nominal fallacy. For example, read the following quick samples from a Google search of “reification alert”:
Each of these is a possible example of reifying, but not really an example of the nominal fallacy.